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Preface 
 
 
This thesis critically evaluates the progress of prenatal genetic testing, and how it, 
along with concurrent social pressures (such as the goal of having the ideal child) may 
have altered parental decision-making, autonomy, and attitudes toward children.  
Literature in this area is not particularly robust, however the scholarship contributed by 
Barbara Katz Rothman, Rayna Rapp, Adrienne Asch, Abby Lippman, Leon Kass, and 
others provide critical insights for this topic.  Distinctive to this thesis is the analysis of 
prenatal genetic testing with a view of the eugenic history of genetics and public health 
initiatives in maternal health.  This thesis will describe what current genetic screening 
pursuits may indicate with this historical understanding.  I will discuss the dynamics of 
these subjects, and how they correspond with current social demands for perfection and 
the growing commodification of children.  With this analysis I will attempt to shed 
greater light upon how our current prenatal screening technologies can modify the 
parent/child relationship, and what this may mean as medical science and technology 
advance.  This thesis will be organized in a three-chapter format, providing a historical 
viewpoint and analysis of salient ethical issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
Chapter 1: The Historical Perspective 
 
 
To provide a historical framework for the modern development of prenatal 
genetic screening, I will introduce eugenics and its influence on medicine and public 
health initiatives.  This will present a context for the establishment of the Division of 
Infant and Child Hygiene within the Indiana State Board of Health, and the Indiana 
Better Baby Contests.  An in depth examination of Dr. Ada Schweitzer, director of the 
Division of Infant and Child Hygiene during the Baby Contests, will attempt to elucidate 
her impact on the health of Hoosier infants.  Her eugenic views and approach to infant 
health, in addition to the overall results of her work will be clarified in this approach.   
The historical perspective of Dr. Schweitzer’s public health initiative will provide 
a relevant structure for understanding the emergence of contemporary prenatal genetic 
screening.  As demonstrated by other scholars, the ideals of eugenics were not 
dramatically discarded with the modern development of genetics.  Authors Wendy Kline, 
Diane Paul, and Daniel Kevles will be particularly important in assisting to articulate this 
aspect of eugenics.  Dr. Schweitzer’s initiative will further illustrate this understanding of 
eugenics. 
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Chapter 2: Transition to Modern Genetics 
 
 
With this historical introduction, I will highlight the ways in which current 
screening methods differ from past initiatives, and describe the current status of prenatal 
genetic testing.  I will compare the parental response to Ada Schweitzer’s initiatives 
(such as the letters they wrote to her worrying about their children’s contest scores) and 
today’s parents’ anxieties regarding health, intelligence, and capacity for success and 
how genetic testing influences this.  Aubrey Milunsky’s Genetic Disorders and the Fetus 
will assist in presenting the scientific community’s view of prenatal testing, and how to 
counsel parents to make “rational” decisions.  I will disagree with Milunsky’s view of 
this decision-making, which will be supported by important literature by Barbara Katz 
Rothman and Rayna Rapp.  Among other points, Katz Rothman argues that the 
experience of motherhood has been fundamentally changed with the introduction of 
amniocentesis and other technologies.  With this insight I will distinguish what may be 
considered “eugenic” about current prenatal screening measures. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Autonomy, Commodification, and Additional Ethical Issues 
 
 
To critically evaluate the use of prenatal screening, I will focus upon parental 
decision-making.  This will include an evaluation of the significance of choice and 
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autonomy provided with screening, especially within the context of being referred for 
testing by a physician, given particular social prejudices, pressures, or negative 
experiences.  As a fundamental ethical issue of this subject, it will be significant to 
question to what degree parental autonomy is secured in the prenatal screening process 
and referral.  Although prenatal genetic counseling is performed in a “non-directive” 
manner, the process of referral and screening may not be as value-neutral or 
unproblematic as this approach may suggest. 
In conjunction with the issue of autonomy, I will additionally consider what is 
viewed as parental decision-making rights with regard to children, and what this may 
indicate with respect to the commodification of infants and children.  It may be argued 
that children are already commodified to the extent that parents pressure children toward 
specific achievements; and commodification may be viewed centrally within the social 
pressures of prenatal testing.  Authors Adrienne Asch, Abby Lippman, Leon Kass, and 
Barbara Katz Rothman will especially be important in framing the discussion of 
autonomy and commodification.  In particular, I will examine and evaluate attitudes 
parents may form toward their selected children in general, and especially toward those 
children who do not turn out as expected.  Although children may disappoint their parents 
no matter their biological origin, I will consider the weight of the parental “investment” 
in technology to obtain a certain kind of child.  I will consider the ways in which genetic 
screening can further the notion that children can (or should) be an object to be chosen 
like an ordinary product.  As it is a compelling social value to have “normal” children, it 
is likely that there will be continued parental demand for the cultivation of technology to 
assist in achieving this standard.  With regard to the paramount value of autonomy, it 
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may be questioned if there can be an ethical argument to preclude parents from choosing 
what kind of child they want.   
Coupled with the overall central question of autonomy, I will analyze the 
prevalent argument of genetic counselors and others that the unique element of personal 
choice involved with prenatal genetic screening indicates that the practice is not eugenic.  
A further issue in parental autonomy relates to the value or quality of life determinations 
that parents make in these situations, and how these appraisals may further involve 
commodification with this choice.  
  1
Chapter 1: The Historical Perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The introduction of Darwin’s Origin of Species and the height of the industrial 
revolution prepared the stage for the eugenics movement.  The desire to have the best 
offspring was by no means a new idea, yet the tenor of eugenics emphasized more than 
what was typically presented by this pursuit.  What made the eugenics movement 
distinctive was the infusion of science along with the new optimism of economic and 
social progress.  The events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century offered 
humanity a sense of mastery of their world that had not been experienced before.  
Eugenics was remarkable in that although it was a movement initiated by the academic 
elite, it extended to have broad social and political appeal. 
Eugenics had an undeniable influence on medicine and public health initiatives in 
the early twentieth century.  This chapter will present the context for the establishment of 
the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene within the Indiana State Department of Health, 
and the Indiana Better Baby Contests.  An in depth examination of Dr. Ada Schweitzer, 
director of the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene during the Better Baby Contests, 
will attempt to illuminate her unique motives, vision, and impact on the health of Hoosier 
infants and mothers.  Her eugenic perspective and approach to infant health, in addition 
to the overall results of her work will be presented in this approach.  The historical 
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perspective Dr. Schweitzer’s public health initiative will provide a focused example of 
the influence of eugenics in maternal and infant care.  In addition, it will provide a 
relevant contribution to understanding the complexities of the eugenics movement.   
 
 
Biographical Information 
 
 
Dr. Ada Schweitzer, a native Hoosier, was born in LaGrange County, Indiana in 
1872.  She attended Michigan State Normal School, and pursued her medical degree from 
Indiana Medical College in 1902 after teaching for a few years.  Schweitzer conducted 
bacteriological research and held health conferences for mothers and girls while in 
medical school, which in part focused on childhood illnesses such as measles, diphtheria, 
and typhoid.  Once she obtained her degree, she became a bacteriologist in the State 
Laboratory continuing the work she initiated during school.  Schweitzer presented in 
several forums, including an exhibit on typhoid in 1915 for the American Medical 
Association in San Francisco. 1, 2, 3, 4  Schweitzer was motivated by the ideas of 
progressive maternalism, and eugenic ideals.  Progressive maternalists embraced the 
infusion of science into motherhood, the understanding of mothers as professionals, and 
                                                 
1 See 1880 US Census Records, http://www.ancestry.com/ 
2 “Indiana’s Work in Child Hygiene,” Indiana Business Women 4, no. 2 (1921): 15, Better Babies Program 
Files, Indiana State Archives (ISA)  
3 Alexandra Stern, “Making Better Babies: Public Health and Race Betterment in Indiana, 1920-1935,” 
American Journal of Public Health 92, no. 5 (2002): 742 
4 Logan Esarey, History of Indiana From Its Exploration to 1922 With an Account of Indianapolis and 
Marion County Vol. IV Dayton Historical Publishing Co, 1924 (accessed via website: 
http://members.tripod.com/~debmurray/marion/marbioref-50.htm#aschweitzer) See also Obituary: Dr. Ada 
Estelle Schweitzer, Annals of Internal Medicine, 1952 Jan; 36 (1): 221 
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being the vital bearers of the future.  Her ambitions in this area lead to her involvement in 
a number of child welfare projects, and in 1918 she was given an appointment in the US 
Children’s Bureau, and in October of that year, she was assigned to take charge of a 
survey to determine the physical and mental normalcy of children.5     
Schweitzer’s association with Dr. John Hurty began in 1906, when she was hired 
through the Board of Health as an assistant bacteriologist for the state laboratory that was 
established in 1905.  Hurty, the director of the Indiana State Board of Health from 1896 
until his retirement in 1922, was a passionate eugenist. 6  While the germ theory was 
gaining acceptance, the theories of human heredity had caught the attention of physicians 
(such as Hurty) who were enthusiastic about developing a superior citizenry.  He was 
committed to purging the unfit from Indiana, and was instrumental in the passage of the 
1905 marriage law, in addition to Indiana’s momentous sterilization law of 1907.7  He not 
only sponsored legislation, but was an active eugenics lecturer as well, and he repeatedly 
warned his audiences that Indiana was suffering from “race suicide,” indicating the 
impact he believed defectives would have on the entire population.8   
Hurty’s proposed response to the crisis included the control of the environment, 
limiting breeding to eugenic parents, and “molding future generations through scientific 
child-saving programs.”9  He saw to it that this critical component of child saving and 
laying the groundwork for the future materialized with the formation of the Division of 
                                                 
5 Esarey, History of Indiana 
6 Grace L. Meigs, director of the Child Hygiene Division, Children’s Bureau, to Sherbon, March 22, 1916, 
4-11-1-5, CF 1914-20, RG 102, USCB, NACP 
7 Alexandra Stern and Howard Markel, Formative Years: Children’s Health in the United States, 1880-
2000. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 127 
8 Stern and Markel, Formative Years, 124 
9 Stern and Markel, Formative Years, 128 
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Infant and Child Hygiene in 1919.10  Ada Schweitzer’s unique experience, support of 
eugenics, and acquaintance with Hurty placed her in prime position to be tapped for 
leadership in this agenda.    
 
 
Creation of the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene 
 
 
Indiana was ahead of other states when it came to a number of public health 
initiatives.  By 1907 Indiana lead the nation with a pure food statute which was passed in 
1899, a vital statistics act, and the first eugenic sterilization law.  As a further distinction, 
the Indiana State Board of Health was ranked sixth nationwide in terms of effectiveness 
according to the American Medical Association in 1915.11  In response to the substantial 
infant and maternal mortality rate, and certainly as a result of his keen interest in child 
hygiene, Hurty submitted the proposal to the legislature for an additional division. In 
1919, Indiana created the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene.  That same year, he 
appointed Ada Schweitzer as director of the division as she was completing her previous 
assignment.   
Hurty boasted to colleagues about Schweitzer’s ability to carry the innovative 
science of eugenics and infant hygiene to the far reaches of rural Indiana, beyond what 
had been attempted by previous health officials.12  Hurty felt that he had the optimal 
                                                 
10 Ibid  
11 James H. Madison, Indiana Through Tradition and Change: A History of the Hoosier State and its 
People, 1920-1945 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1982), 309 
12 Hurty to Children’s Bureau, June 18, 1920. 4-15-2-16, CF 1914-20, RG 102, CB, NACP 
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candidate to reach the Indiana population, and indoctrinate the people with eugenic ideals 
and scientifically based approaches to motherhood.  By the time of her appointment to 
the division, Schweitzer had already extensive experience organizing an assortment of 
child hygiene projects and maternal education classes.  She was also an active participant 
in notable eugenic forums such as the Indiana Mental Hygiene Association.  Schweitzer 
evidently possessed the characteristics that Hurty desired of an individual to fill the 
position.   
Schweitzer was giving direction to division personnel even before it was provided 
appropriations by the legislature, as they were adamant that they could not let babies “die 
while waiting for the Department to be organized.”13  She instructed them to continue to 
gather general health information about the children, such as their defects, height, and 
weight, in addition to obtaining birth registrations.14  Women from various club and civic 
groups were directed to carry out these instructions before Schweitzer’s arrival to the 
division.15  These groups were instrumental in laying the groundwork, and continued to 
be active participants in various initiatives after the division was fully operational.  
Clubwomen sponsored mother’s classes, assistance for expectant mothers, and placed 
information on maternal and infant health in public libraries, among other activities, all of 
which ensured that Schweitzer’s endeavors would be maintained and cultivated at the 
local level.16   
                                                 
13 Indiana Child Welfare Committee to County Chairman, July 16, 1919, Report of the Child Welfare 
Committee, Division of Infant and Child Hygiene (DICH), ISA 
14 Ibid 
15 Albion Fellows Bacon to Tri Kappa Secretary, Aug 11, 1919, Report of the Child Welfare Committee, 
DICH, ISA “A few days ago we sent you a letter explaining a plan of cooperation between the State Board 
of Health, the Indiana Child Welfare Committee, the Extension Division of Indiana University, and the Tri 
Kappa.” See also Albion Bacon to Tri Kappa Secretary Aug 6, 1919 
16 Schweitzer, “Some of the Ways in which Club Women have Cooperated with the Child Hygiene 
Division,” 1924, DICH, ISA 
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Before the division was formally created, numerous local groups had already 
taken the initiative to begin their own “child saving” programs.  Each was independently 
pursuing their work, and did not have any formal coordination.  Schweitzer needed to not 
only provide guidance for the state’s official division, but devise a way to recruit these 
independent groups to be under her direction as well.17  Fortunately, Schweitzer had 
already built a rapport with a number of groups as a result of the child hygiene lectures 
she had previously organized and presented (while in medical school and immediately 
after), and they were eager to work with her: “Five years ago, Dr. Schweitzer conducted a 
Health day at Winona Lake Chautauqua.  This year as soon as the Child Hygiene Staff 
program was announced, a request came from the Directors of the Winona Lake 
Chautauqua for a Health Week, under the Supervision of the Director of The Child 
Hygiene Division.”18  When Schweitzer initiated her work at the division, she quickly 
began to receive requests from a variety of civic clubs, towns, and counties to hold 
additional health conferences and lectures.  Many were excited to coordinate with 
Schweitzer; evident with the volumes correspondence she received.  The success of her 
early exhibitions encouraged Schweitzer to continue to develop infant and maternal 
health education in this format, and to support the fairs to be initiated on a larger scale.19 
The crisis of the infant and maternal mortality rates across the nation did not go 
unnoticed by the federal government, and the reduction of infant mortality became the 
                                                 
17 Schweitzer to H. C. Carpenter, May 5, 1919, DICH, Correspondence, ISA “As our appropriation is not 
available until October, I am working under numerous handicaps, one being the number of organizations 
that are attempting child hygiene work independently of each other.  As they seem willing to cooperate 
with us, we are trying to formulate a program that will bring about better coordination of effort.” 
18 Report for the Quarter Ending September 30 1920, DICH, Department of Labor Children’s Bureau 
Correspondence, ISA 
19 Schweitzer to Anna Rude (Director Division of Hygiene, U.S. Children’s Bureau), July 27, 1920, DICH, 
Department of Labor Children’s Bureau Correspondence, ISA 
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primary objective of the US Children’s Bureau in 1921.20  That same year, the Sheppard-
Towner Act was passed.  Administered by the US Children’s Bureau, the act granted 
matching funds to states that established infant and maternal welfare agencies and 
approved legislation for such public health objectives.  The resources provided by this act 
tripled the budget that Schweitzer had to work with, significantly enabling the 
proliferation and reach of the fledgling division.21  Schweitzer took full advantage of her 
funds to extend the depth of her team, and the scope of her programs.  The Sheppard-
Towner Act would prove to be the boost necessary for drastically increasing the 
division’s functional capacity and effectiveness. 
 
 
Ada Schweitzer and the Division 
 
 
Schweitzer’s energy and dedication as shown in her previous child hygiene 
projects, was given an enhanced platform with her appointment to the Division of Infant 
and Child Hygiene.  She was eager to educate women on the proper science of 
motherhood, teach them who could be considered “fit” to reproduce, and monitor their 
children with her guidance.  This education was essential to ensure quality infants; 
motherhood was not just a personal choice, it was a political act which required proof of 
                                                 
20 Stern and Markel, Formative Years, 130 
21 See Richard A. Meckel, Save the Babies: American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant 
Mortality 1850-1929 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) 
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merit.22  Eugenics elevated the responsibility and achievement of motherhood by 
emphasizing the unique position of women to promote the superiority of the population.  
As a physician and a woman, Schweitzer was a vital instrument for this message.  She 
intended to provide families with information identifying the fitness of their offspring, 
and guidance as to what would be appropriate regarding future children.  Schweitzer was 
confident that with the appropriate instruction, she could improve maternal care and the 
quality of children.  As such, the overarching goal of the Division was indeed “baby 
saving;” accomplished by monitoring infant and child health, in addition to advising and 
educating mothers regarding their children.   
When Schweitzer and her team were on location, they invited mothers to bring 
their children for examination, and provided medical and nutritional advice and circulars.  
Schweitzer’s 1920 annual report identified that the Division had already conducted 
conferences in 27 of Indiana’s 92 counties, examined 8,000 children, and presented in 
290 towns.23  It was not long before letters poured into the Division addressed to 
Schweitzer from mothers inquiring about the conferences and asking for further advice 
regarding their children.  Schweitzer had a significant audience that needed little 
convincing of her authority, and they were anxious to implement her directions.  Eugenic 
ideology was a pervasive force by the 1920s, and was promoted everywhere from 
universities to home town organizations.  It influenced decision making regarding 
marriage and family, in addition to perceptions and standards of “normal”.  The pressure 
to produce children that could be considered good enough to compete in what would 
                                                 
22 See Wendy Kline. Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century 
to the Baby Boom (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001) 
 
23 “Annual Report of the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene, Indiana State Board of Health for the Year 
Ending September 30, 1921,” 4-11-1-3, CF 1921-24, RG 102, CB, NACP 
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become the Better Baby contests, or receive high marks during medical evaluations, is 
evident in the letters that Schweitzer received and generated enough anxiety to make 
some consider not becoming parents at all.24   
Schweitzer sent numerous letters to local physicians, parents, civic leaders to 
promote the maternal health classes, describing and reiterating the “hazards” of 
motherhood: “much remains to be done before the average loss of mother’s life per 
thousand has been lowered…Last year 436 Indiana mothers lost their lives when their 
babies were born, 1 to every 166 births.”25  In addition to these letters Schweitzer also 
sent the schedules of classes and lectures, which included other statistics and information: 
“In 1921 in Indiana 68,247 babies were born.  Of these 2,358 died before reaching the 
age of one week… Many mothers do not realize the value of being under a doctor’s care 
throughout their pregnancy… Some men still think that the best obstetrical care is too 
expensive, yet a funeral costs more.”26  Schweitzer was concerned that parents did not 
have the knowledge or training to adequately meet their responsibility to produce 
satisfactory children, and as such the educational thrust of the division was her primary 
focus: “Because so many women do not understand the scientific basis of mother care, a 
course of instructions in the essentials of such care has been prepared… It is hoped to 
impress prospective parents with the importance of safeguarding in every possible way 
our Indiana mothers and babies.”27  Schweitzer was confident that with the proper 
training and knowledge of eugenics, in conjunction with Indiana’s existing marriage and 
sterilization laws, superior children would fill Indiana’s population. 
                                                 
24 Kline, Building a Better Race, 91 
25 Schweitzer, “The Hazards of Motherhood” 1921, DICH, ISA 
26 Schweitzer, “Facts Concerning Maternity and Infancy” 1922, See also “Outline of Classes for Mothers,” 
DICH, ISA 
27 Schweitzer, “The Job of Being a Parent” 1924, DICH, ISA 
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Better Babies and Eugenics 
 
 
The theory of evolution displaced man from his vaulted position over the rest of 
creation, yet it also ushered in the critical notion that the trajectory of human 
development could be manipulated like any other stock animal.  The concurrent industrial 
progress and urbanization produced a new America.  The rapid change of this period 
encouraged the belief that society could be molded to a particular ideal.  With this 
foundation eugenics was presented as a natural extension and application of scientific 
knowledge, and its vision seemed to support values (such as intelligence and physical 
prowess) that many believed to be important for prosperity.  Advocates of eugenics 
argued that the movement was concerned with not only the “imbeciles and epileptics but 
with the average middle-class family and with the genius as well.”28  In depicting the 
movement as for the well being of society and the benefit of traditional families, 
proponents of eugenics offered convincing evidence for participation.  The appeal 
extended beyond the academic and elite, as it came to be viewed as a progressive social 
plan that would bring about a utopian-like civilization filled with those that had the most 
gifted physical and mental qualities. 
The benefits of a eugenic program appeared to be so self-evident that leaders 
within the movement were confident that eventually romance and “eugenic principles” 
would go “hand in hand for happier homes, healthier children, and the minimization of 
                                                 
28 “Social Problems Have Proven Basis of Heredity: What the Work Done in the Eugenics Record Office at 
Cold Spring Harbor Has Proved in Scientific Race Investigation”. New York Times. New York, N.Y.: Jan 
12, 1913 
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imbecility, hereditary disease, pauperism, and crime.”29  This perspective was not unlike 
that of Schweitzer.  Once women were properly trained in infant hygiene, she was 
confident they would become progressive mothers who would produce a superior crop of 
babies.  Schweitzer conceded that the “gates of heredity” were closed once a baby was 
born, and therefore was adamant regarding the need to restrict birth to only fit parents and 
then provide these parents with sound training in scientific child rearing.30  Only in this 
manner could better children be produced.  Schweitzer regarded this strategy as plainly 
obvious even to the common farmers whom she informed: “You can not make a silk 
purse out of a sow’s ear, neither can we make a citizen out of an idiot or any person who 
is not well born.”31  This common-sense presentation, rather than mysterious new-fangled 
science, was an essential component to Schweitzer’s message.   
Schweitzer’s ideas about the inferior part of the population were like those of 
many adherents to eugenics who came to the realization that the problem of the unfit was 
an epidemic.  One of the primary problems was considered to be individuals that 
possessed substandard mental capacity, or were “feebleminded.”  With the assumption 
that mental deficiency was heritable, the rampant growth of an unfit population was a 
leading fear.  The Indiana Society for Mental Hygiene, established in 1916 in response to 
the “menace of the feebleminded,” was an assortment of Indiana’s prominent reformers 
and public officials.32  Dr. Schweitzer was a vocal member from the very beginning, and 
presented a paper at the 1917 conference.  Her lecture at the conference, “The Menace of 
the Mental Defective,” illustrates her observation of the problem: 
                                                 
29 Ibid 
30 Stern, “Making Better Babies,” 749 
31 Schweitzer to Mr. George B. Lockwood, March 20, 1916, DICH, ISA 
32 “Mental Defectives in Indiana Second Report of the Indiana Committee on Mental Defectives: A Survey 
of Eight Counties,” December 27, 1918, Board of State Charities, ISA 
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In many localities, the morasses of mental defectiveness which 
Have existed there for decades afford no foundation for this  
structure (of public health).  Into these sinkholes of civilization 
have been poured sympathy and money… and (yet) they have  
continued to become wider and deeper…Studies of groups of  
these people living in more or less isolated communities show  
them to be antisocial with a tendency to intermarry and to 
produce numerous offspring having the defects of the parents  
somewhat accentuated in each succeeding generation…They  
live in a shiftless way under unsanitary conditions and resent 
any interference with their habits. …The utter irresponsibility  
of these defectives may be considered both the cause and the 
result of the high percentage of alcoholics among them… 
(they)mate with mental defectives possibly of some other type 
and proceed in their usual prolific manner to perpetuate both 
types of defectiveness…33 
 
Schweitzer viewed the prevention of marriage of the feebleminded as only a partial 
solution, and considered the sterilization and segregation of “recognized idiots and 
imbeciles” as essential to lower their reproduction and prevent venereal disease. 
The problem of feebleminded was intertwined with Schweitzer’s initiative to 
improve the fitness of Indiana’s children.  She regarded the prevention of 
feeblemindedness as one of the keys to improving the vitality and efficiency of the 
individual. 34  Schweitzer believed that the condition of the population was the “province 
of every thinking person,” and that the overwhelming understanding was that only those 
that were deemed fit could produce a “race of individuals sound in body and mind.” 35  
With the introduction of the marriage and sterilization laws, Schweitzer viewed her role 
as primarily with the education of the public as a means to supplement the legislation.  
This included informing individuals as to what were considered to be desirable 
                                                 
33 Schweitzer, “The Menace of the Mental Defective” 1917 Indiana Conference on Mental Hygiene, DICH, 
ISA 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
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characteristics of physical and mental disposition, the “undesirability of mating high 
grade defectives having similar traits,” in addition to advocating frequent medical 
examination “especially proceeding marriage, (the) proper provision for prenatal and 
infant care, medical supervision of children in the avoidance of physical and mental 
habits…(and) cultivation of an altruistic spirit which will readily sacrifice personal ease 
to racial welfare.” 36  Schweitzer was confident that implementing a multifaceted 
approach of citizen cooperation with eugenic legislation would ensure the stability and 
health of the population. 
The lectures, conferences, and health fairs were not only Schweitzer’s venue for 
health education, but also the opportunity for her to expound on the “virtues of Indiana’s 
eugenic marriage and sterilization laws, which she believed ensured the robustness of 
Hoosier babies.”37  Beyond her involvement with the Mental Hygiene Society, 
Schweitzer wrote several essays, articles, and poems to deliver her views.  In 1923, 
Schweitzer presented the “Physical Inequalities of Children” which identified that:  
“Parents cannot give to children that which they themselves lack.  If both parents are 
mentally defective, the child will be mentally defective.  Children of this type are 
hopeless…”38 
The baby contests began in 1920, and were the most popular event that the 
division supported.  Schweitzer presented the baby contests as a “School of Education in 
Eugenics,” in which the benefit would be better Indiana babies.39  In her essay, “The 
                                                 
36 Schweitzer, “The Menace of the Mental Defective” 1917 Indiana Conference on Mental Hygiene, DICH, 
ISA 
37 “Abstract of Lectures for Mothers’ Classes,” 11-16-1, CF 1925-28, RG 102, CB, NACP, See also Stern, 
“Making Better Babies,” 747 
38 Schweitzer, “Physical Inequalities of Children” 1923, DICH, ISA 
39 Schweitzer, “The Benefits of a Better Baby Contest” 1920, Better Babies Program Files, ISA 
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Benefits of a Better Baby Contest,” Schweitzer outlined the sources of inferior infants: 
“We have scientific proof that the baby whose life began when either both parents were 
poisoned by fatigue, alcohol, or disease, does not have a fair chance.”40  She utilized the 
language of crops and breeding to appeal to her audience, who typically had been raised 
on farms and understood this rationale.  In the mother’s classes that she initiated, 
Schweitzer encouraged the women to investigate before their marriage what “undesirable 
heritable traits or constitutional disease lurked in either side of the family line that might 
lower the vitality of possible offspring.”41  These classes became widely popular, and in 
1925, “16,649 women - more than 50 percent of all attendees nationwide - took mothers’ 
classes in Indiana under the aegis of the Division of Infant and Child Hygiene.”42 
She was perhaps not as overt a eugenist as other colleagues, but was consistent in 
her views of what was unfit and what was healthy.  In this way, Schweitzer promoted 
eugenic policies and perspectives as she attempted to improve children’s health and 
modernize rural mothers.  Schweitzer seemed to be principally interested in the role of 
parents in carrying out the proper scientific applications that she was promoting.  As a 
eugenist she supported sterilization and marriage legislation to ensure that only fit parents 
reproduced.  However, in her capacity at the division she seemed focused on children’s 
health as a means to ensure eugenic products.  Most of Schweitzer’s eugenic rhetoric was 
directed at parents: “A vast majority of parents voluntarily brought their own children 
because they wished advice concerning them.  A few came at the request of committees 
or of their physicians, or of the county nurse.  There were some who were feebleminded 
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and some who were too shiftless to carry out instructions…”43  By focusing on children’s 
health and parental education, she was confident in the division’s endeavor to improve 
the future. 
The height of the baby contests came in the mid-1920s, and Schweitzer 
endeavored to establish them as valuable in that they “set the best standards of health 
before the parents that they may compare these with the actual condition of their child.”44  
In 1923 the Indianapolis News established a sponsorship of the contests, and provided 
more space for articles in addition to full-length pages with photos of contestant babies.45  
This gave the division and the contests a tremendous boost in publicity, and enthusiasm 
for the continued to gain in popularity.  The state fairs were known to pull in one-fifth of 
the population, and this was a captive audience that Schweitzer could not ignore as an 
opportunity to deliver her message.46 
Schweitzer was given the authority to oversee all of the components of the 
contests, especially the scoring and award of prizes, to ensure they were as fair and 
objective as possible.  To maintain the level of professionalism that she expected, 
Schweitzer used scorecards “based directly on the template formulated by the American 
Medical Association and the Children’s Bureau.”47  As a result, she consistently 
distinguished the contests supported by the division at the state level, and those that were 
taking place without their involvement on the county level.  It was no secret that the 
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criteria for a baby contest to be legitimate, in Schweitzer’s eyes, it needed to be 
authenticated directly by the involvement of her division. 
 
 
The Schweitzer Impact 
 
 
During her term from 1919 to 1933, Ada Schweitzer lectured to hundreds of civic 
associations, authored an abundance of articles and poems, and assessed the physical 
condition of babies in all of Indiana’s 92 counties.  After one decade, the division had 
examined 77, 584 children, lectured to 55, 171 mothers, and reached almost half of the 
population with the distribution of pamphlets.  In her final five-year assessment, 
Schweitzer reported that the division was averaging 80 counties per year, audiences for 
mother’s classes had increased in the previous two years by 83,443, and film 
presentations had more than doubled since the time of her last report.48  Over 14 years 
she built an authoritative, effective, and respected public health agency.  Schweitzer 
unquestionably modified Hoosier attitudes about health, maternity, and childhood with 
her direct recommendations and broad appeal.  Parents were indeed attentive to her 
eugenic message, and eager to utilize her advice. 
In 1932 the last baby contest was held, as a result of the change in the state’s 
political profile with the 1933 elections.  Republicans were blamed for Indiana’s 
continued economic crisis, which had persisted since the 1929 stock market crash.  The 
1933 election was a significant victory, as Democrats took control of the Indiana House 
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of Representatives for the first time since 1914.49  The new governor, Democrat Paul V. 
McNutt, promised the public that the government would be reorganized to eliminate 
bureaucratic redundancy.  Consequently, he dismissed the entire division and established 
the Department of Child Health and Maternal Welfare under the Indiana University 
School of Medicine.  A new administrative bill had gone under effect, which placed the 
State Board of Health and other departments under the direct supervision of the governor, 
“giving him absolute power of both appointments and salaries.”50  Schweitzer insisted 
upon conducting her work as usual up to the very end, although she was long aware that 
the division would likely be dissolved.51  No female physicians or reformers were 
included in McNutt’s reorganization, which was to emphasize pediatric teaching and 
training through the medical school instead of Schweitzer’s “hands-on infant and 
maternal hygiene projects.”52 
The dissolution of the division seemed to largely be the result of a new governor 
seeking to establish himself.  However, Schweitzer had apparently also generated 
significant jealousy among other medical professionals.  As with similar agencies in the 
country, Schweitzer’s staff at the Division was predominantly women and not physicians, 
all of which provoked the indignation of the (almost entirely) male medical 
establishment.53  The efforts of the division and Schweitzer to professionalize infant and 
maternal welfare and urge mothers to consult their physicians ultimately “enhanced the 
authority of doctors and bolstered the notion that private primary care was the most 
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credible mode of child health.”54  The infusion of science into motherhood was indeed 
one of her goals, and making sure that they regularly consulted their physicians was an 
important element of this.  Nevertheless, Schweitzer’s success in this area did not seem to 
appreciably endear her to other physicians. 
Eugenics certainly informed Schweitzer’s outlook on health, and how to achieve 
better babies.  It served as a framework for her support of strict enforcement of marriage 
and sterilization laws, in addition to her understanding of health and disease.  
Schweitzer’s eugenic views may be considered classic in many respects; to identify 
superior babies as an example and motivation for other parents was a natural extension of 
the eugenic ideal to have the best offspring.  For Schweitzer, eugenic ideals were best 
achieved in the realm of eugenic education, adult fit marriages, sterilization, and 
segregation of defectives.  Perhaps owing in part to her recognition that the “gates of 
heredity” was closed after birth, Schweitzer consistently desired infants and children to 
be dutifully cared for by progressive mothers that were well informed of eugenic 
expectations for their offspring.  Schweitzer’s unique approach was evident in her work, 
and helped to define the lasting impact she had on Indiana mothers and children. 
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Chapter 2: Transition to Modern Genetics 
 
 
Beyond a handful of attentive academics, few appreciate the range and depth of 
individuals and viewpoints involved in eugenics.  It was a movement in which various 
scholars and regular citizens turned to science to provide an authoritative and rational 
explanation for the world and means to correct its ills; an endeavor that has not 
significantly changed in the last hundred years.  Although eugenics took on different 
forms in various countries, the concept of social responsibility and “scientific activism” 
to provide personal and social fitness was indeed shared.55  The movement is frequently 
castigated as “pseudoscience,” like astrology or alchemy, and therefore to have little 
bearing on today’s real science of genetics.  Under this view, legitimate geneticists of the 
1920s recognized the fallacy of eugenics and eliminated it from their work.  The sharp 
divide that many attempt to draw between genetics and eugenics generates historical 
accounts of genetics devoid of its roots, and “underlies the mocking tone that often creeps 
into descriptions of the eugenics movement.”56  By retracing the steps from Schweitzer’s 
Better Baby Contests to today’s prenatal screening, we will observe how eugenics has 
been intertwined in the development of genetic testing. 
During the Depression, budgets shrank and Schweitzer’s division was a casualty 
of this reality.  However, the stresses of this period also seemed to encourage eugenic 
principles.  For instance, in a 1937 Fortune magazine survey of its readers found that 66 
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percent favored compulsory sterilization of mental defectives, 63 percent for criminals.57  
Support for such initiatives did not fade when the Nazi abuses were exposed after World 
War II, as eugenics was not disposed of but repackaged and renamed in a variety of 
ways.58  The postwar period brought a shift to individual choice and private decision 
making under the new terms of “medical genetics”. 
Some eugenicists, such as Charles Davenport, had always given “marriage 
advice” to those that inquired.  However, genetic and pre-marriage counseling did not 
formally emerge until the 1940s with heredity clinics and university genetics 
departments.59  During this period the American Eugenics Society and others directed 
their attention to this medical type of approach, and paved the way for facilities devoted 
explicitly to genetic advisory services.60  Similar to Schweitzer’s initiatives, the focus 
was to educate individuals on eugenic values (and selecting a fit mate) to create the right 
family.  One of the first genetic clinics, founded in 1941, was the Dight Institute for 
Human Genetics at the University of Minnesota.  Its creation was the result of the estate 
that Charles Fremont Dight left to the University to promote eugenics.  His will stipulated 
that a site be maintained for “consultation and advice on heredity and eugenics and for 
rating of people, first, as to the efficiency of their bodily structure; second, as to their 
mentality; third as to their fitness to marry and reproduce”.61 
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Clarence Oliver, the first director of the Institute, asserted that “a geneticist should 
prevail upon some persons to have at least their share of children as well as show a black 
picture to those with the potentiality of producing children with undesirable traits”.62  
Clinicians were optimistic that once clients were taught of their hereditary, they would 
“nearly always follow their doctor’s advice”.63  Sheldon Reed, director of the Dight 
Institute from 1947 to 1977, disliked the term “genetic hygiene” that was often used to 
describe the clinic’s service, and presented “genetic counseling” as an alternative when 
he became director in 1947.64  He advocated neutrality with respect to the reproductive 
decisions of clients, but like others he expected that once counseled clients would do the 
right thing: “It could be stated as a principle that the mentally sound will voluntarily carry 
out a eugenics program which is acceptable to society if counseling in genetics is 
available to them”.65  Even without the formal laboratory diagnostics for prenatal testing 
(which was soon to come), genetic counseling was already an active component of the 
modern eugenic message. 
The ability to test the fetus for particular characteristics was realized in 1955, 
when Serr et al. (and a year later Fuchs and Riis) reported that antenatal determination of 
sex could be made by examining the X-chromatin body in human amniotic fluid cells.66  
Then in 1959 Jerome Lejeune, a French physician, developed the first karyotypes of 
Down’s syndrome.  However, he was opposed to the development of prenatal testing and 
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intended to find cure for Down’s syndrome.67  Nevertheless, even without formal testing, 
it was common practice to allow damaged or defective babies die in the back of hospital 
nurseries or automatically send them to institutions.  Families were instructed to forget 
these babies and have other children; the birth of a disabled baby was “understood to be 
an unqualified tragedy from which women should be spared”.68 
Despite Lejeune’s intentions for his research, the development of karyotyping 
quickly left the bench to be applied the bedside.  The diagnosis of fetal chromosomal 
disorders by karyotypes was reported in 1967, and in 1968 the Lancet published the first 
report of an abortion performed to prevent the birth of a fetus diagnosed with Down’s 
syndrome.69  Soon after, in 1969, the first master’s level program for professional genetic 
counselors in the U.S. was established.70  These professionals would take on the task of 
genetic advising that physicians themselves had previously handled.  Academics assumed 
that once the principle of parental choice for a normal child was established, the desire 
for normal children could be relied on to result in the “voluntary elimination of affected 
fetuses”.71 
During the 1960s and 70s, paternalism in medicine was being challenged and 
personal autonomy was becoming an established standard in healthcare practice.  
Concurrent with this event, prenatal screening increased dramatically with legalized 
abortion and official endorsement.  In 1960 there were between thirty and forty 
counseling centers in the U.S.; by 1974 the number had inflated to about four hundred.  
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Almost a quarter of these centers were created and maintained with assistance from the 
National Foundation of the March of Dimes.72  At a meeting of the American Academy 
of Pediatrics in 1975, the results were presented of an NIH collaborative study indicating 
that amniocentesis for prenatal diagnosis was not only “reasonably safe for mother and 
fetus but also very accurate”.73  Another analysis estimated in 1974 that $5 billion spent 
over 20 years to reduce the incidence of Down’s syndrome with voluntary screening and 
abortion, would save the U.S. more than 18 billion.74  With these and other formal 
approvals, prenatal screening started to become a permanent fixture.  
Most prominent and pioneering scientists in genetics at this time were active 
eugenicists, and did not shy from being vocal about their perspective.  Like many others, 
they equated medical genetics with “good eugenics,” and believed that eliminating the 
unfit could be just as easily (or even better) accomplished by individuals.75  Even Francis 
Galton believed that coercion was not necessary to make the right reproductive choices.76 
Much like Ada Schweitzer believed, geneticists surmised that one only needed to be 
educated of this rational approach to complete their responsibility.  For instance, Nobel 
Prize-winning geneticist Hermann J. Muller proposed the establishment of sperm banks 
stocked with superior “germinal material,” and artificial insemination to generate 
superior human specimens.  Donations to the bank would be voluntary, and from 
“persons of unusual moral courage, progressive spirit, and eagerness to serve mankind”; 
so Muller was confident that the plan was compatible with democratic values for 
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society.77  He believed that the establishment of reproductive control was the right way to 
accomplish eugenic ideals.  Although he conceded that the earlier version of eugenics 
was mistaken, he considered that to be “no more argument against eugenics as a general 
proposition than… the failure of democracy in ancient Greece (as) a valid argument 
against democracy in general”.  Francis Crick, who identified the structure of DNA with 
James Watson, stated that he agreed with Muller and wondered himself “why people 
should have the right to have children”. 78, 79 
The attitudes of these scientists are not surprising; eugenic explanations of human 
behavior and biology were endorsed in classrooms around the country well into the 
1960s.80  In addition, prominent eugenic journals and societies still existed (or changed 
their names to something innocuous) for academic discussion.  The American Eugenics 
Society for example did not find it necessary to change its name to the Society for the 
Study of Social Biology until 1973.  This change did not signify any change in ideology; 
as the society’s directors clarified, it did “not coincide with any change of its interests and 
policies”.81  It is evident that long after the last Better Baby Contest, eugenics was 
embraced by leading biologists and geneticists, and was “integral to the research 
programs of prominent, powerful institutions devoted to the study of human heredity”.82 
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Amniocentesis was the first method of prenatal screening, but by the 1980s, 
ultrasound screening, chorionic villus sampling, and maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein 
screening were utilized as well.  The original use of prenatal ultrasound screening was to 
correct gestational age, locate the placenta, and identify twin pregnancies.  With the 
improvement of imaging technology, the capacity to disclose structural abnormalities was 
quickly seized upon.83  Media coverage worldwide of the advances in genetic 
biotechnology throughout the 1980s assisted in transforming “prospective parents’ hopes 
into real expectations for having a healthy baby”.  The introduction of maternal serum 
testing in particular provided the ability to screen all women with a simple blood test, and 
dramatically widened the scope of detection.84, 85  However, widespread use of the test 
was somewhat resisted until professional organizations such as the AMA warned of the 
medical malpractice risk that could be incurred if doctors neglected to offer screening.86 
These “recommendations” provided a heavy push to include screening as standard 
prenatal care.  This standardization became obligatory in California when in 1986 it 
became the first state to mandate that all prenatal care providers offer the maternal serum 
screen test to every pregnant client.  The scope of this mandate was immense; as a result, 
by 1990 over 60 percent of eligible Californians were tested with the maternal serum 
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screen.87  As part of its keen interest in this endeavor, the state put a great deal of effort in 
the design of informed consent and patient education.  Success of the program was 
measured by the number of decisions to terminate after diagnosis, since the public health 
“benefits” of screening entirely depended on the avoidance of those detected with 
anomalies.88 
Genetic screening and counseling sessions are most often initiated by the 
obstetrical services, and typically the only indication being “advanced maternal age”.89  
Women’s conventional exposure to this notion of age-related risk produces what Abby 
Lippmann has termed “iatrogenic anxiety”.  This refers to the generic pregnancy 
anxieties that women identify with their respective age, and “the statistical category to 
which they have respectfully been assigned”.  Lippman further asserts: “It is no 
coincidence that the prenatal procedures the medicalized approach to pregnancy 
promotes, are offered to pregnant women as the means by which to assess and alleviate 
the problem of risk that fostered this iatrogenic anxiety in the first place”.  This 
effectively “enlists women to become self-regulating and self-disciplining”.90  Sociologist 
Rayna Rapp reiterates this observation: “The current generation of pregnant women is the 
first to be given an epidemiology of trepidation, and taught to live by the numbers”.91  
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This medically generated anxiety has increasingly been produced by obstetrics in general, 
and prenatal testing in particular. 
Like other scientists, scholars, and experts, Watson concurred with the screening 
and elimination approach, stating that by “terminating such pregnancies, the threat of 
horrific disease genes contributing to blight many families’ prospects for future success 
can be erased”.  In addition, Watson asserted that attempting to “see the bright side of 
being handicapped is like praising the virtues of extreme poverty… there are many 
individuals who rise out of its inherently degrading states, but we perhaps most 
realistically should see it as the major origin of asocial behavior”.92  The sentiments of 
cost and burden are echoed in a variety of bioethics and medical professionals’ 
justifications of prenatal diagnosis and abortion, the cost to the family, the child, and 
society were simply too immense to allow such lives to continue.  In a world of limited 
resources, selective abortion was presented as an appropriate response. 
Other prominent bioethicists went further with this concept of cost and harm, 
asserting that to knowingly bring a child with impairment into the world (whether cystic 
fibrosis, Down syndrome, or deafness), is unfair to the child because it robs him or her of 
the “right to an open future”.  Joel Feinberg identifies the conflict of parental autonomy 
and a child’s future autonomy with cases such as that of a Jehovah’s Witness parent 
objecting to a needed blood transfusion for their child.93  Feinberg introduces the “open 
future” argument as a means to appropriately balance parental autonomy in such 
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instances.  Dena Davis extends Feinberg’s concept to that of prenatal testing; with an 
analysis of the desire to have a child with a particular disability (such as deafness), and 
taking advantage of prenatal information to ensure such a child.  Davis contends that 
disabilities limit the range of life options or “open future” available to the child.94  As a 
result, parents have a responsibility to provide their children with nurturance and 
opportunities that will enable them to lead satisfying lives.  Due to the disadvantages of 
disability, Davis’s use of the “right to an open future” argument asserts that parents 
should not subject a child to these limitations, and as a moral imperative ought to avoid 
deliberately bringing such children into the world.95  On the basis of “significantly 
reduced life options,” other arguments presented by ethicists advanced that it was not 
only unfair but morally wrong to bring a disabled child into the world.96  Such positions 
reiterate the call for social responsibility in reproduction that was accepted as biological 
fact in the eugenics movement.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, various researchers and physicians advocated 
following California’s lead in universal screening.  Studies emphasized the cost savings 
that would be obtained with expanded screening, and asserted that all women would want 
to avoid disabled children, not just those over 35.  For instance, analyses eagerly affirmed 
that prenatal screening was “cost effective” at any age by evaluating the costs of offering 
amniocentesis to be easily offset by the savings associated with preventing the birth of an 
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infant affected by Down’s syndrome.97  In addition, of women given a positive diagnosis 
of Down’s syndrome, reports cited figures as high as 93% would then terminate their 
pregnancy.98  Under the canopy of personal choice, the general assumption was made that 
reasonable, rational people would want to screen for disabilities and terminate 
pregnancies that are diagnosed as positive.  That the expected decision is termination is 
evident in reports identifying the “major obstacles” interfering with “rational decision 
making” as “religious beliefs, denial, lack of a grasp of probabilities, and lack of 
knowledge about genetics and biology”.99  As a result of these cost-benefit analyses and 
recommendations from researchers, new guidelines from the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists were announced in January 2007 stating that all 
pregnant women should be offered screening for Down syndrome regardless of age.100 
Genetic counselors are uniquely placed in the delivery of information to expectant 
parents.  In addition, they consider themselves as being nondirective in this position as 
they are simply providing amniocentesis as a means to acquire information; something 
believed to be value neutral.  Instructional textbooks intended for counselors recognize 
the position of the counselor, and note that current technologies allow them to report 
about birth defects that may have little or no genetic basis, and common diseases of 
adulthood that have heterogeneous causes.  In addition, it is acknowledged that they may 
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soon be capable of providing information regarding “normal” behavioral and physical 
traits.101  However, although these capabilities and the position of the counselor implicate 
an array of ethical issues, these developments are not identified in any way as 
problematic territory.  Beyond the issues created by the use of these measures, the 
complexity of genetic information, as well as the counselor’s client volume creates an 
impractical situation for achieving comprehensive client education even with ample time 
and a sophisticated listener. 
Acknowledging these subjects, genetic counselors are nevertheless advised to 
simply present information “in ways that the client can interpret and act on”.  In addition 
they are to entice clients to anticipate how a course of action could affect them, such as 
“consequences for the interrelationships of the couple, the effects on their other children, 
the suffering of the affected child, the possible social stigma,” among other personal 
costs.  Reflecting on the “economic burden of a defective offspring on society” is 
considered by some a reasonable point to make in addition. 102  As one author states, 
remaining “impartial is difficult and takes conscious effort but is largely attainable.  The 
difficulty lies mainly in trying to remain impartial while aiming to prevent the occurrence 
of genetic disease”.103  The “efficacy” of genetic counseling is often identified in terms of 
comprehension.  Essentially, the client should be provided with the information that will 
enable them to make the most “rational” decision.104 
As can be observed with modern counseling, the concept of properly educating 
individuals regarding genetics so that they may make appropriate choices was an 
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important component of Ada Schweitzer’s initiative.  Schweitzer’s common sense 
presentation in avoiding offspring that are “feebleminded” or inferior was part of the 
broad appeal of her work and that of others within eugenics.  Galton in particular 
believed that eugenics ought to be “introduced like a new religion”.  Once society 
understood the value of eugenics, the public would naturally integrate the practice into 
daily life and general decision making.  He considered it to be essential that we 
“cooperate” with nature by securing humanity with the fittest individuals.  Galton mused 
that what nature routinely carries out “blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do 
providently, quickly, and kindly.  As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to 
work in that direction”.105  He understood the importance of bringing eugenics to the 
common person.  Once these persons bought into the value of eugenic practice, it would 
be perpetuated by these same individuals as they attended to their societal duty.  
Reflecting on this, Galton acknowledged that the “power of social opinion is apt to be 
underrated rather than overrated.  Like the atmosphere in which we breathe and in which 
we move, social opinion operates powerfully without our being conscious of its 
weight”.106  Drawing attention to the progression of eugenics and genetics with that of 
professional and public opinion, we may observe the important points of continuity that 
result in action and policy. 
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Chapter 3: Autonomy, Commodification, and Additional Ethical Issues 
 
 
The 2007 guidelines from the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, state that all pregnant women should be offered prenatal screening.  These 
guidelines are the new phase in the aggressive movement for quality control in 
reproduction.  Such guidelines ought to induce reconsideration of the intentions, goals, 
and implications of prenatal testing and the medical management of pregnancy.  
Disappointingly, the announcement of the recommendations did not immediately 
generate serious debate or discussion by bioethicists, physicians, or the public.  The 
guideline introduction was without fanfare as a minor news side note, as though the 
extension of prenatal screening to all was simply a logical continuation of what has 
already been implemented.  Is society’s penchant for medical testing so ingrained that 
individuals no longer flinch when more is introduced, or are we simply unaware of the 
effects it could have on potential parents, children, and our attitudes toward each other? 
Modern medicine has provided the opportunity for more people to enjoy life.  At 
this point in history the outlook for a disabled individual’s health has never been better; 
yet at this same moment our ability to seek out and eliminate particular individuals in 
utero has never been greater.  This unique juxtaposition calls into question the 
assumption that eugenics is not relevant to modern medicine.  In spite of this, attempting 
to discuss the issues related to prenatal testing and eugenics with a genetic counselor or 
physician does not likely generate much engagement on their part.  Such professionals, 
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and indeed many other scientists, ethicists, and academics, are likely to wave off 
suggestions that these two subjects have much to do with each other.  After all, patient 
autonomy is the prevailing ethic in medicine, sterilization laws have been repealed, and 
the Nazi atrocities are a thing of the past.  Yet, we should not take much reassurance with 
such a response.  Genetic determinism is as prevalent with the public today as it was in 
the past, and most of our social stereotypes and prejudices are still powerfully active.  
The pressures for conformity and aesthetic appearance or function are as strong as ever 
and assuredly have an impact on values for reproduction.   
Leon Kass provides an important counter to those disinterested professionals: 
“We physicians and scientists especially should refuse to finesse the moral question of 
genetic abortion and its implications and to take refuge behind the issue, ‘Who decides?’ 
For it is we who are responsible for choosing to develop the technology of prenatal 
diagnosis, for informing and promoting this technology among the public, and for the 
actual counseling of patients”.107  Biomedical researchers and clinicians not only develop 
the technologies of medical care, but are also frequently given a central role in designing 
health policies.  As Kass suggests, they are in a unique position to decide the direction of 
scientific investigation, and influence institutional and public acceptance of what they 
create.  Yet when a technology or procedure arrives to the bedside, patients assume it has 
been given a full and nonbiased assessment by competent authorities and given the moral 
rubber stamp by the appropriate experts.   
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A primary argument made by promoters of prenatal testing is the existence of 
strong social demand for this screening.  However, statistics demonstrating the persistent 
increase in the usage of diagnostic screening tests by medical professionals were essential 
in persuading public authorities and others that the public was widely in favor of testing.  
The argument provided by scientific experts then became a self-fulfilling prophecy: by 
stressing how many tests have already been performed, more tests are regarded as 
necessary.108  This tactic operated in a similar manner with the implementation of eugenic 
policy; scientific professionals presented their reasonable data showing the menace of the 
unfit, and politicians and the public eagerly adopted the proposed solutions. 
 
 
Autonomy, the Illusion of Choice, and the Routinization of Prenatal Testing 
 
 
The emphasis on patient autonomy and self-determination became a cornerstone 
ethic in medicine during the 1960s with the period’s expanding technical abilities and 
changing social tide.  Modern medicine no longer could paternalistically inform the 
patient of a treatment plan, but needed to engage them in ways that would allow decision-
making among the options available.  However, autonomy can be fully exercised only by 
those properly informed or comfortable enough to use it.  This becomes difficult to 
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achieve with over half of the U.S. population considered to have low health literacy. 109  
A lack of basic health knowledge creates considerable difficulty for patients attempting to 
communicate with their physicians and understand many other aspects of their care.  
Medical professionals can easily miss this type of inadequacy since those that do not 
know what to ask are likely to ask nothing at all.  When patients are deficient of the 
knowledge to make an informed decision, they cannot fully participate in the 
management of their health.  Although doctors control when and how they deliver 
information to patients in order to facilitate understanding, the nation-wide rates of low 
health literacy demonstrate that many patients do not fully comprehend or engage in their 
care.      
As a concept of self-governance, autonomy is especially difficult to ensure for 
patients in the complex and arcane territory of genetics and prenatal testing.  Informing 
the patient sufficiently to make typical health care decisions is a task in of itself, to 
attempt to accomplish such a feat with a situation involving genetic information creates 
another challenging layer.  Yet it would be a mistake to designate autonomy as the 
unitary consideration in testing; multiple interests are at stake that are not revealed under 
simplified terms of personal “choice”.  Any one-dimensional notions of genetic 
counseling belie the numerous subjects that influence decisions regarding prenatal 
screening and children.  Such factors include physicians’ and counselors’ attitudes toward 
testing, patients’ experience with the medical system, opinions of family members, an 
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array of social pressures, and attitudes that patients’ may have developed toward 
disability and medical testing.110   
Although genetics has become a mainstream topic in popular media, this does not 
translate into substantial knowledge or understanding of genetics or its application in 
prenatal screening.  As with rates of overall health literacy, overall knowledge of prenatal 
diagnostics and the meaning of the results that are presented is low according to several 
studies, indicating that patients are not well-prepared to make decisions regarding 
screening.  For instance, although most women are referred for genetic testing through 
their physician, a recent study identified that fifty-five percent of those surveyed “stated 
they received no information from their care provider,” and only a third considered them 
as a “very helpful” source of information.  The purpose of the testing was also not well 
understood, as nearly half of the same respondents did not consider ultrasound as a screen 
for anomalies, and nearly sixty percent stated that they were not informed it was their 
option to proceed with testing.111  
Research that further probed prenatal care clinic visits reported similarly 
disappointing results.  Obstetricians’ discussions regarding genetic testing with patients 
“averaged 2.5 minutes for women younger than 35 years of age and 6.9 minutes for older 
women,” and were seldom comprehensive; topics discussed most often were limited to 
the practical details of testing and only twenty-two percent of providers indicated that 
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ultrasound screening is voluntary.112  With this information, it is not surprising that 
couples often are not aware of what information a prenatal diagnostic test may reveal or 
specifically what the testing has to do with the health of their fetus.113  Coupled with this 
lack of awareness of what testing entails, individuals generally have difficulties 
comprehending abstract possibilities, and what such information can or cannot 
indicate.114  When presented with a set of “odds” that their child may have some sort of 
impairment, it is challenging for couples to comprehend what such information means.  
Some may overestimate the relevance of a small probability, or underestimate certain 
others.  In her observation of women going through prenatal testing, Rayna Rapp noticed 
many patients politely insist that they understood what was being presented, and (as in 
other medical interactions) when they did not grasp a concept they would blame 
themselves rather than the unclear explanation.115  This and other research suggests that 
women, and parents in general, have limited knowledge of the purpose, limitations, and 
potential consequences of prenatal testing, and as a result, lack sufficient information to 
support informed autonomous decision-making.116  
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The autonomy ethic in medicine requires informed decision-making, but also calls 
for the respect for patients’ choice not to have particular information imposed upon them.  
Presenting unwanted detail regarding prenatal testing may force patients into an 
involuntary situation.  Several researchers have debated the value of reporting abnormal 
ultrasonic markers to patients since they frequently are of no clinical significance, but 
often result in considerable patient anxiety.117  However, most women enter prenatal 
exams without knowledge of such possibilities and consider an ultrasound examination 
(for instance) to be a positive experience, and as a result few are likely to have the 
foresight to opt out of receiving particular information regarding abnormalities unless 
they are explicitly given the opportunity to do so.  Indeed, it is quite unusual for a patient 
to be aware that an ultrasound may identify fetal anomalies, to have reflected on the 
implications of such a finding, and to be forceful enough to present her views prior to the 
examination.118 
The offer of testing usually has an accompanying indication of its benefits, 
making it difficult for patients to consider the screening as something they may not want.  
A survey of women going through with amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling 
indicated that seventy-five percent of them found it difficult not to accept a prenatal 
diagnostic test once it was offered.  Many of the women stated that they felt “free from 
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external pressure,” but nonetheless felt an “obligation” to have the testing.119  An 
obstetrician, reiterating this issue, noted that a growing number of women in his practice 
appeared to become emotionally “trapped” by a testing procedure to which most 
consented to with the expectation of a pleasant experience and expert reassurance.120 
Several have argued that screening provides reassurance for the expectant mother, 
and they are choosing to make sure everything is going well.  However, many authors 
have noted women’s efforts to establish an emotional distance from the fetus were “often 
accompanied by feelings of confusion, alienation and ambivalence… (and) the 
experience of uncertainty regularly predisposed for long-lasting distress, even after the 
ruling out of a chromosomal aberration by invasive testing”.121  Several studies have also 
identified that parental distress after screening can then negatively affect their attitude 
and relationship with the child after birth, or force them into making other difficult 
choices.122  A “vulnerable child syndrome” has been recognized that develops in the 
wake of disease risk labeling or other similar events during pregnancy, birth, or infancy, 
in that the parents may perceive their child to be particularly susceptible to illness or 
injury.123  Such a posture toward children alters the dynamic of the parent-child 
relationship in ways that may not have occurred otherwise.  It has further been noted that 
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prenatal screening results can induce a clinically significant level of anxiety, and there are 
several documented mechanisms by which such intense stress can negatively affect the 
fetus.124   
Prenatal screening has largely been subsumed under the normal procedures of 
obstetric care during pregnancy.  In no small part this has been due to the possibility of 
malpractice jeopardy for a physician, which is more likely to occur when a woman is not 
tested.  Tests such as ultrasound, maternal serum screens, and amniocentesis are blandly 
presented as standard care, an arrangement which significantly contributes to patients’ 
acceptance rates.  For instance, in an evaluation of the procedures for offering maternal 
serum screening in California, the test was often described as “just a simple blood test”.  
And although women were sometimes informed that screening was not mandatory, it was 
found that this statement was often paired with the emphasis that screening was a 
California state program or that it was recommended.125  The researchers, Nancy Press 
and C. H. Browner, found that although their interviews with the women revealed both to 
them and to the women that the informed consent process was not successful in 
conveying “information about test procedures and the conditions being screened for, or to 
get women to consider ethical issues involved in screening,” their subjects 
“overwhelmingly professed satisfaction” with the amount of information they had been 
given.  
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Intriguingly, Press and Browner additionally report that their subjects’ responses 
were “notably brief and stereotypical to all interview questions which concerned the 
moral aspects of prenatal diagnostic testing, their reasons for accepting the test, or what 
they might do following a hypothetical positive result”.126  The results of their study 
overall revealed that women tended to consent to maternal serum screening without an 
encouragement to give it much thought.  When the women were inquired further to think 
more about the test, they continued to frame the screening “in exactly the terms it had 
been presented to them - as having to do with reassurance, as simply another part of 
responsible prenatal care.  Some even suggested that they had taken the test because they 
wanted to ‘do everything (they) could to help (themselves) and the baby’”.127  Certainly 
there are situations which prenatal testing results could provide an opportunity to treat 
and therefore help the fetus, but more often than not the conditions tested for are not 
treatable, and the primary option with screening is termination not treatment.  The 
interview responses that Press and Browner obtained reveal a general lack of this 
understanding, and what the overall purpose of screening truly is.    
The results of Press and Browner’s interviews, among other studies, suggest that 
strong institutional or provider support is the best predictor of prenatal testing 
acceptance.128  The way that screening is presented not only affects patients’ decisions, 
but also shapes their understanding of the meaning and purpose of these procedures.  The 
discussion of screening with that of other typical blood tests and prenatal care routine 
makes it difficult for the patient to distinguish one test as unique from all others, and also 
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establishes a clear assumption that the test is going to be done.  This not only encourages 
women to be tested, but simultaneously discourages them from reflecting about their 
decision.  Indeed when any medical tests appears to be standard, or supported and 
recommended by the medical community, patients do not have a reason to be suspicious 
and will likely accept such an offer without question.  Routine prenatal care is viewed as 
a responsible action, and an obligation which directly influences the health of the infant, 
and with screening subsumed under this rubric questions are not likely to be aroused.  
These points reveal the powerful “social, moral, and economic forces” which direct 
women to prenatal screening and accepting the testing as “routine”.129   
Existing in the world of standard medical practice, there is no debate of the ethical 
concerns that exist.  For instance, those few women that did exhibit misgivings about 
screening did not seem to “regard their fear as a reasonable response to the inherent 
tensions in a test which can find, but not correct, problems”.130  Of subjects interviewed, 
nearly eighty-five percent of those who agreed to testing not only stated that they did not 
deliberate much in their decision, but they also had trouble articulating “precisely why 
they had accepted testing”.131  Those interviewed by Barbara Katz Rothman described the 
utilization of screening and subsequent decision-making as their “only choice;” although 
they were not being forced per se, the women did feel “the experience of no-choice in a 
choice situation”.132  With California as a prime example of the rapid establishment and 
acceptance of screening procedures, it is clear how the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists’ latest universal testing guidelines came without a hiccup of debate.   
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Attitudes of Health Care Professionals and Nondirectiveness 
 
 
Scientists, physicians, and other health professionals are “unused to thinking that 
their work is anything but self-justifying, (and) may balk at suggestions that their work 
may not be unqualifiedly good in results”.133  Those that endorse prenatal screening 
typically offer nondirective genetic counseling, patient autonomy, and personal choice as 
distinguishing features from that of eugenics.  While claiming value neutrality may be an 
attractive position, it disregards what is at stake with these procedures, and obscures 
typical underlying assumptions that “rational” people will make the “right” choices when 
they are informed.  Indeed, Francis Galton, Ada Schweitzer, and those that established 
the first genetic counseling centers counted on individuals to voluntarily follow eugenic 
logic once properly taught.  Nondirectiveness is attractive to genetic professionals in that 
it absolves them of any responsibility of arriving at a recommendation, and places the 
burden fully on the patient.  The insistence of neutrality creates a lack of open discussion 
of what the over-arching goals of aggressive screening are and the relevant meaning of 
eugenics.134  
There are key elements of typical genetic counseling sessions that create problems 
for the claim of nondirectiveness.  It is difficult to claim neutrality as a guiding ethic for a 
technology explicitly cultivated to identify and accordingly eliminate those with genetic 
flaws.  The very existence and routinization of prenatal screening implies anything but 
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neutrality.  Developing and offering this testing presumes that scientific and medical 
resources ought to be utilized to diagnose and eliminate the identified fetuses.  Despite 
this, genetic counselors and medical professionals are trained to believe they are neutral 
and nondirective while offering this “value-charged technology”.135    
The shaping of the legitimacy of prenatal testing is derived from “wider cultural 
assumptions about the positive value of any kind of screening.  From the moment 
screening techniques are developed, they benefit from a favorable preconception”.136  In 
addition, as in a traditional medical setting, the patient enters the counseling situation 
with a distinct knowledge disadvantage and is dependent on the information that is 
chosen to be presented.  Although the patient may be “free” to refuse any testing or 
medical procedure offered, they must assert this refusal to a professional providing a 
recommendation for such screening.  The offering of a procedure immediately implies 
that it is something that the individual ought to take advantage of, and is for their best 
interest.  It is assumed that information and knowledge is a positive pursuit that enables 
educated decision-making.  However, the structure of the offering encounter does not 
initiate a thoughtful discussion or raise particular ethical flags for expectant parents to 
consider; rather, screening is suggested with the expectation that it will be accepted. 
The offering of testing implies that the conditions that may be detected ought to 
be avoided, and in this manner “entails a tacit recommendation to terminate a pregnancy 
if the fetus is abnormal… the offer and acceptance of genetic counseling has already set 
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up a likely chain of events in everyone’s mind”.137  Such information is not empowering, 
it is incapacitating.138  The role of the parent is no longer simply that of a caretaker, but as 
a quality control officer as well.  Information is never neutral, and the expected response 
is evident with high acceptance and termination rates, as most couples that receive 
positive results for defects choose to terminate.  This response weakens parental ability to 
accept children as they are, and encourages them to judge the quality of the particular 
fetus.  The weakening of parental acceptance of their children provides a basis for 
inflated notions of what parenting can bring in terms of fulfilled expectations.  Children 
inevitably differ from what parents envision, and reinforcing particular expectations with 
genetic testing creates an opposing standard from the unqualified acceptance parents 
ought to have for their children.  If prospective parents cannot accept and nurture a child 
that departs from their desire, they may not be truly prepared for the experience of 
parenthood.  Prenatal screening generates a criterion to be met to warrant parental 
nurturance: we will love you unconditionally, if you pass this test.      
Although many argue that termination of those with lethal or “serious” defects 
can be justified, and believe that we can ensure a non-arbitrary distinction between 
“serious” and cosmetic or treatable conditions, such boundaries do not hold in actual 
practice.  For instance, during the 1980s and early 1990s (when prenatal screening 
became more fully developed and more frequently offered), the number of babies born 
with cleft lip fell by forty-three percent and those born with club foot fell by sixty-four 
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percent, even though both are rectifiable surgically.139  Medical and genetic professionals 
nevertheless refer to boundaries such as sex selection to demonstrate that prenatal testing 
can be limited to legitimate “medical conditions,” and therefore testing is morally 
acceptable and not eugenic.  However, the sex of an individual is identifiable genetically, 
and is “associated with variations in phenotype, health, longevity, life chances”.140  
Although these are the descriptive terms offered in the diagnosis of disability, we have 
accepted that gender ought not to be a basis for distinction or valuation, even though it 
makes a difference physically.  
Gender selection is considered incompatible with the unconditional acceptance 
that parents ought to have for their children, and that developmental psychologists have 
affirmed is essential to successful parenting.141  Social efforts need to continue to 
emphasize the value of each, rather than reinforce negative attitudes.  This situation 
seems to be precisely what those with disabilities assert; that there is more to someone 
than simply a particular diagnosis.  Regardless, as the “normalizing gatekeeper,” parents 
are asked to decide on the value of life amidst their perceived fears of raising a disabled 
child.142  Medical genetics and society sets the standards for what are acceptable and 
unacceptable children, and parents are placed in the role of confirming those values.  
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Although women going through prenatal screening are in a medical setting, where 
they are accustomed to receiving a practitioner’s recommendations, they are instead 
being asked to come up with an answer.  The woman must take the full responsibility and 
blame for whatever decision is made.  Prenatal testing individualizes the problem, and 
allows the rest of society to neglect taking collective responsibility for the needs of its 
members.  Katz Rothman accurately describes this circumstance of choice: “We make it 
the woman’s own.  She ‘chooses,’ and so we owe her nothing.  Whatever the cost, she 
has chosen, and now it is her problem, not ours”.143  This is not to suggest that counselors 
are not providing guidance, rather, they must select what information the woman is given 
and thereby “decide what is to count as a fact, which facts to present, and how to present 
them”.  These decisions impose a “professional frame” within which patients are 
confronted with a restricted range of options from which they are expected to choose.144 
This professional frame does not automatically indicate an intentional deceit or 
hidden agenda on the part of the counselor; however one can “channel” patients through 
the decision-making process by couching replies to women in terms that are liable to 
generate action in the track believed to be correct.145  Although this may seem directive, 
counselors do not actually suggest any particular option; although they may emphasize 
the negative aspects of a condition.  For conditions deemed “serious,” nearly thirty 
percent of U.S. genetic professionals acknowledged that they would provide negatively 
slanted counseling, and those polled said they personally would terminate a pregnancy 
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involving Down’s syndrome, and many would abort for any abnormality.146  The 
problematic attitude of providers regarding disability is further revealed in a study of 
mothers who wanted to continue their pregnancy, despite a positive diagnosis.  The study 
found that some professionals continued to emphasize a negative outlook throughout 
their conversation with these prospective mothers, asking questions such as: “What are 
you going to say to people when they ask you how you could bring a child like this into 
the world?”147  Even while aiming to be nondirective, counselors by necessity shape the 
session by focusing attention toward some topics and away from others, and as such lead 
the overall decision-making.   
Families with a disabled child are often thought to be dysfunctional or 
exceptionally burdened financially and emotionally, and it is presumed that many 
marriages end in divorce as a result of this stress.  Genetic and medical professionals (and 
several academics) also suggest that a poor quality of life is inevitable for those with 
disabilities, and terminating such fetuses is therefore a kind of altruism.  Despite the 
literature indicating the rewards of raising children with disabilities; those in bioethics, 
public health, and genetics “remain woefully – scandalously – oblivious, ignorant, or 
dismissive of any information that challenges the conviction that disability dooms 
families”.148  Such assumptions are relentlessly exemplified in medical research that 
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correlates quality of life with particular levels of disability.149  Such research typically 
emphasizes that the most negative aspects a disabled person suffers are as a direct result 
of their disability.  Adrienne Asch identifies this stance as one of the false assumptions 
underlying the negative view of disabled persons’ quality of life.  The other assumption 
that Asch describes which contributes to this view is that because there may never be a 
complete physical recovery, there is not an opportunity to have a rewarding life.  Asch 
argues that social factors are the primary source of the difficulties that disabled persons 
face, and that disability does not preclude having a meaningful life.150  The impossibility 
of neutrality is visible in the inherently unequal professional-patient relationship that 
exists in the clinical environment.  The negative pressures in society and medicine result 
in an overwhelming abortion rate and significant psychological costs for women.151 
Although counselors may emphasize an assortment of issues such as cost, time, 
dependency, and the child’s future when parents receive a positive diagnosis, these are in 
fact general concerns that every parent faces, and are not unique to those with disabled 
children.152  Often parents do not understand the limits of prenatal diagnosis, and believe 
they can decide depending on the severity of a particular disability.  Yet the diagnosis of 
a condition such as Down’s syndrome cannot predict the degree of mental retardation, or 
other health concerns, nor can it predict the experience of having any child.  Any 
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assurances of a “normal” child still cannot guarantee one that a parent envisions or hopes 
for.  Barbara Katz Rothman points out that even ordinary children can be distressing and 
demanding, “talk to themselves, have imaginary friends, stare into space, and won’t 
respond.  Ordinary, bright kids sometimes do not learn to talk for a long time, have 
trouble with their letters, fail math”.  Prenatal screening cannot ensure “normal” children, 
but it does reinforce social biases and changes the parent-child relationship by 
encouraging children to be the viewed as the embodiment of a diagnosis.153 
The ideal model presented by genetic professionals combining individual rights, 
self-determination, and truly informed consent does not readily take into account the 
practical circumstances of interactions between health professionals and patients or the 
power and information imbalance that exists.154  Such issues, coupled with most patients’ 
low health literacy and the poor comprehension of probabilistic results, present a much 
different model of prenatal screening.  Abby Lippman observes that “some features of 
prenatal diagnosis do increase control, but allocate it to someone other than a pregnant 
woman herself”.155  Our acceptance of the notion that parents ought to produce the “right 
children” has created the sentiment that a woman is irresponsible if the screening offered 
is not taken advantage of.  Disabled children born to women that do not consent to 
screening and abortion may be viewed as less deserving of support, since this pregnancy 
outcome was deliberately chosen.  Such considerations invariably limit autonomy, and 
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frustrate individual efforts to accept a particular child into the world.156  However, as 
families raising disabled children and those with disabilities reveal, impairment does not 
prevent a positive parenting experience or fulfilling life for the individual. 
Aggressive screening technology reduces a potential human being to one part 
(genes) rather than considering the whole person that could be.157  The offering of testing 
for particular traits and disabilities designates that these are the factors on which parents 
ought to base their decision-making.  It establishes a particular class of human beings as 
having a life that is not worth living, and therefore justifiably eliminated from the 
population.  Genetic testing promises so much, yet delivers little on its claims of 
improving autonomy and parental “choice”.  Although screening is presented as 
enhancing reproductive decision-making it is a “calculated mode of influence that 
increasingly limits the field of possible conduct in response to pregnancy,” and with the 
acceptance of testing “pregnant women are enlisted to facilitate the normalization of the 
fetal body”.158  In this manner, the birth of a disabled child will be increasingly viewed as 
an act of negligence.  Marsha Saxton asserts: “the message at the heart of widespread 
selective abortion on the basis of prenatal diagnosis is the greatest insult: some of us are 
too flawed in our very DNA to exist; we are unworthy of being born…”159  As the 
expectations and standards of production increase, individuals will be expected to 
comply.  
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Others argue that prenatal testing allows parents to prepare for a disabled child 
when they do not terminate, the perceived “win-win” of being able to terminate or being 
able to “get ready”.  The aspect of preparation seems reasonable, but the benefit of such 
information is assumed, and does not truly ease the experience or assist parents with their 
disabled children.  When parents with disabled children were interviewed by Press and 
Browner, the unhelpfulness of “advance notice” was made fully apparent.160  The notion 
of preparation gives an implicit but misleading guarantee of what is to come; obscuring 
that the possibility of caring for an ill or disabled child cannot be eliminated by even the 
most aggressive prenatal screening.  Some parents may desire testing because they could 
“never raise a retarded child,” or “couldn’t bear” a disabled individual, “as if these things 
could be predetermined… (and) written in code ahead of time”.161  The elimination of 
those with congenital impairment does not prevent the occurrence of any other trauma 
that may occur during pregnancy or delivery that can be disabling, nor does it safeguard 
children from any number of potentially disabling accidents.  Prenatal testing does 
provide a false sense of “security” and reinforces the notion that caring for an individual 
with impairment shackles the caretaker to a miserable existence.   
For those that consider the goal of pregnancy to be the production of a healthy 
baby, screening and abortion simply allows the woman to move on and try again to meet 
this goal.  If a normal child is not to be expected, why bother continuing?  Katz Rothman 
describes this “product-oriented” logic toward pregnancy, and identifies how this concept 
leaves out any consideration for the woman’s experience of pregnancy.162  Dutch 
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midwives that Katz Rothman interviewed reiterated the importance of a “good 
pregnancy” in which the woman enjoys the expectation of a baby.  The midwives 
differentiated the status of the fetus from the woman’s personal experience: if the fetus’s 
impairments cannot be treated, “Why spoil the pregnancy?”163  These midwives 
identified the value of pregnancy, and how prenatal screening and termination ruined a 
potentially positive overall experience.  As a result of this value, many of the midwives 
interviewed found a good pregnancy to be very important, whatever the outcome.164  
Even in instances in which it is certain that the baby will not survive infancy, Katz 
Rothman emphasizes that screening and abortion results in the death of the woman’s 
expected baby, “without the saving grace of a good birth and a good death”.165 
 
 
The Problem of Genetic Determinism 
 
 
Prenatal screening, like traditional eugenics, furthers the notion that we are 
primarily the products of our genes.  Although we may give a nod to environmental 
contributors, “genetic determinism” emphasizes genes as the most important basis for 
what we are or can become.  The language used in regard to genetic disease “leads us to 
the easy but wrong conclusion that the afflicted fetus or person is rather than has” a 
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particular disease.166  In the context of genetic screening, determinism supports the 
assumption that “genetic diagnostics of any kind have more predictive power than other 
kinds of health risk assessments, and that all genetic health problems inevitably unfold in 
the lock-step fashion of our traditional models”.167   
How disability is viewed in relation to the individual is fundamental to how the 
practice of screening may be considered.  Some scholars assert that the human essence 
remains unchanged despite such intervening afflictions; others maintain that what it is to 
be human (and therefore have value) is lost with the absence of particular capacities.  
Whether identity consuming or related to an identity, how disability is considered with 
regard to the person reveals what is truly indicated by the label of disability.  If those with 
impairment are indistinguishable from their disability, in that it is essential to what the 
individual is, then it may be claimed that one could eliminate disability with prenatal 
screening and termination.  For instance, if one is a Down’s syndrome baby, rather than 
having the condition of Down’s syndrome, then this disability may be considered to be an 
identity consuming property.  Viewing an individual as having the condition of Down’s 
syndrome presents the perspective of this trait as an accidental feature of the person’s 
existence, which does not change who they are as human beings.  An individual with 
bipolar disorder may however view themselves as inseparable from their condition, in 
that they cannot think of themselves as being who they are without this particular trait.  
Nonetheless, such an individual is more than the itemized list of clinical symptoms of 
bipolar disorder, however integral that property may seem to be to the person’s concept 
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of self.  The reductive view of being one’s disability or disorder fails to consider the 
person beyond the impairment.  Individuals are more than a particular condition, and 
have value regardless of the afflictions they may have.   
When we can identify particular genes, we can exert control and predict them.  
Yet, even our classic examples of straightforward “single gene” disorders such as 
Huntington’s disease do not necessarily produce the symptoms typically believed to be 
certain.  Research has discovered that carrying one of Huntington’s multiple genotypes 
that cause symptoms does not ensure that a problematic clinical syndrome will 
develop.168  Despite such exceptions, determinism persists throughout public and 
academic sectors and forms the strong social obligation for disease carriers to not 
“spread” their affliction.  Science and media hype project genetics to be the secret to our 
health and well-being.  
Deterministic thinking does extend hope for a better world: we just have to create 
better people.  Genetic makeup will become the new (and scientifically legitimate) basis 
for discrimination.  The original eugenics involved clumsy attempts of control, our 
sophisticated modern approach offers a more antiseptic and clinical version, “but both are 
hopelessly mired in the reductionist thinking that fails to imagine the whole as something 
more”.169  Yet with all of the anxiety over our genetic resultants of reproduction, a 
mother’s zip code still remains the best predictor of an infant’s mortality and life 
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chances.170  Our modern amazement and preoccupation with our genes further distracts 
us from the larger social and moral considerations of our most central problems.  As Asch 
emphasizes, it is these social considerations which are the primary source of the 
difficulties that disabled persons face.  Genetic determinism leads us to consider genes as 
the basis of all our troubles, and therefore genetic technology as the supreme solution.  
As such, genetic counseling providers are attentive to guiding their clients to make the 
“correct” reproductive decision. 
 
 
The Goals of Testing 
 
 
Some authors suggest that it is possible to logically separate the disabilities that 
we want to prevent, and the persons that currently have such impairments.  In this way, 
one can consider the prevention of a disabled infant from being born as simply preventing 
that pathological impairment and not an actual person, and therefore no moral or eugenic 
implications are incurred regarding those living with disability.171  This argument does 
not consider the conditions identified to be identity constituting in any morally significant 
way, “because there is no person or other morally significant subject upon which an 
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identity might be constituted”.172  These authors contend that parents could be 
encouraged to avoid the birth of those that are disabled, while still supporting 
antidiscriminatory policies, without inconsistency.  
The question of moral status for a fetus or embryo or its moral identity in relation 
to the person who may be born with a disability, is a significant and ongoing debate.  If 
aborting a fetus involves eliminating the moral equivalent of a person, then such an 
action is morally problematic; if, however, it is the elimination of something that may 
potentially become a person, then the action is considered morally permissible.  
Regardless of the level of moral status that may be assigned to the fetus, prenatal 
screening itself is problematic.  Even with a concession that a fetus has no moral status, 
eliminating on the basis of impairment devalues those persons with disability.  The 
prevention those with impairments from being born indicates the disdain society has 
toward disability in general and disabled persons specifically.    
It is often claimed that prenatal screening does not reinforce unjust prejudices as, 
for instance, sex selection could.173  Yet the motivations to go to such lengths to prevent 
those persons that would have disabilities (or be a particular gender) cannot indicate that 
one equally values the life of such individuals.  Society’s negative view of life with 
disability is communicated with the development prenatal screening and efforts to urge it 
on every pregnant woman.  Eliminating fetuses on a singular feature indicates that such a 
condition “invalidates the whole of the person the fetus would potentially become, and 
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that this cannot but have implications for those currently living with such conditions”.174  
Once a particular life is considered to not be of value, it becomes expendable and ceases 
to have meaning as an entity deserving rights, protection, and care.  It is not avoiding just 
any fetus, but one deliberately tested, marked with a particular characteristic, and 
subsequently devalued as a result of that feature.  
Prenatally screening and avoiding a disability is accomplished by avoiding the 
entire individual, and society views such lives as burdens that are expendable, or ought 
not to exist.  There are many assumptions about raising a child with disabilities, and 
genetic screening seeks to allow the avoidance of these presumed experiences.  
Reflecting on the “blandly underinformed and underinforming routinization of 
mainstream aspects of prenatal diagnosis,” we can observe the duty and personal 
responsibility concepts at work as they had with Ada Schweitzer’s eugenic education 
projects and other similar initiatives of that period.  Eugenic propaganda reinforced that 
society’s ills could be resolved by preventing certain types of individuals, and a collective 
responsibility to achieve a community improved by science.  Schweitzer’s maternal and 
child hygiene efforts presented this logic to mothers, and their duty toward future 
generations.  The interests we actually have in mind with prenatal testing differ 
significantly from those of curing certain illnesses. 
What is perceived to be important in having a child factors importantly into how 
various authors view the ultimate goal of reproduction and the assistance of science in 
achieving that goal.  If we view children as products that ought to fit a particular design, 
then an efficient and precise quality control seems to make sense.  Customers are not 
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satisfied if the product invested in is defective and does not function properly.  For 
instance, Daniel Kevles considers the purpose of reproduction as the creation of 
“independent, autonomous individuals… who will no longer need nurturance”.  In the 
prenatal screening process, Kevles suggests that parents ought to base their decision-
making on the likelihood that the individual will develop that purpose of 
independence.175  However, this view assumes that genetic screening and clearance of 
normality guarantees an end product person that will fit this or any ideal.  Nevertheless, 
Kevels contends that individuals can morally make such decisions, and medical 
professionals are obligated to comply, even if the decision has been made with “a eugenic 
calculus, with which the provider did not agree”.176  However, this suggests that children 
are like property, existing purely for the parents.177  This view additionally does not 
recognize the involvement of the medical community in the development and promotion 
of screening, the prejudices of society that enable this response, or any further 
consideration other than what is presumed to be personal choice.   
Ronald Green considers the goal of prenatal screening as the prevention of harms 
to society and children, by not allowing disabled individuals to be born.  Green not only 
asserts that preventing such persons averts harm, but failing to do so is morally wrong.  
Whether “knowingly, deliberately, or negligently,” he believes that a child is “morally 
wronged” when brought into the world “with a health status likely to result in 
significantly reduced life options relative to other children”.178  In response to notions 
that the particular child that may result ought to be reflected upon, Green finds that a 
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child “should not be compared with that child’s own nonexistence.  Rather it should be 
compared with the reasonably expected health status of others in the child’s birth 
cohort”.179  These considerations identify fetuses and children as “fungible” or generic 
and interchangeable, and Green finds no moral quandary in eliminating such units 
identified as disabled or unacceptable.  However, the concept of fungible entities does not 
accurately portray the woman’s prenatal experience with a child.  Pregnancies are not 
generic, and those that are lost are not replaced but uniquely regarded and 
contemplated.180  
A major focus of Green’s perspective is the assumed suffering incurred by the 
parents and children with impairment.  Yet actual and potential suffering should not be 
confused, as this muddies the issues to be analyzed.  The harms believed to be 
experienced by disabled children and parents are often inaccurate or incomplete, and 
Green’s assessment does not provide an adequate presentation of such relevant concerns.  
The obligation to avoid the birth of a child affected by genetic disorder is a eugenic 
justification that fails to consider or value those outside of an arbitrarily constructed 
norm.  The concept of such a standard and what it means to deviate from that criteria 
presents as a meaningful question with regard to prenatal screening. 
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Issues regarding Quality of Life and Prejudice 
 
 
At the basis of many quality of life assertions for prenatal screening is the notion 
of “species-type functioning,” which has been imported into the bioethics discourse from 
the work of Christopher Boorse.  The distinctions of normal and abnormal function are, 
according to Boorse, empirically grounded in objective scientific findings of the natural 
world.181  This definition is utilized to support normative consequences in the writings of 
Norman Daniels, Dan Brock, and others.  These determinations suggest that those that are 
disabled have a lower quality of life as a result of impairments placing them outside the 
norm, and that such lives ought to be prevented. 
Although several academics and medical professionals claim that we can 
simultaneously value impaired individuals, and non-eugenically eliminate those with 
these same characteristics, such a convenient logic does not seem to be convincing.  It is 
difficult to reason that a society “which had overcome its fears of disability and truly 
considered disabled people as equal members” would still have such an intense interest in 
prenatal testing.182  In addition, the overwhelming negative bias of health care workers 
generates difficulties for the counsel they provide and avow to be impartial.  Our 
pervasive discrimination of those with disabilities extends to bioethics and medical 
literatures; exhibiting assumptions and stereotypes that strip value from those with 
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impairments.  The presumed lack of quality of life has been challenged in a number of 
studies, yet this reasoning persists as a factor offered to parents.   
To most observers, those with disabilities seem to live an undesirable daily 
existence at the expense of their caretakers.  However, studies that interview disabled 
persons reveal a majority that considers their quality of life as good or excellent.183  The 
anxiety that the disabled have unsatisfying lives is reinforced by prenatal screening, and 
assists to generate the notion that parents will be permanently disappointed by having 
such a child.  Although those with disabilities report that they have “serious limitations in 
activities of daily living,” they nevertheless frequently report they have a good or 
excellent quality of life.184  They understand their condition, set meaningful goals, and 
remain connected in their social networks.  These tactics seem not much different than 
what other individuals do to maintain a positive outlook in life, yet many still insist that 
those with disabilities must be worse off than “normal” persons or are an undue burden 
for parents.185  As a result of such perceived certainties, academics and genetic 
counselors alike promote prenatal screening.  This, in accordance with the assumptions 
that Asch describes, generates the belief that the suffering incurred with disability can 
only be avoided by preventing those affected individuals.   
Given our differing positions in life, we each must contend with a variety of 
opportunities that are not open to us.  In the pursuit of an opportunity our experiences 
open particular doors while closing off certain others, and those with disabilities consider 
                                                 
183 Albrecht, Gary, Patrick Devlieger. “The disability paradox: high quality of life against all odds,” Social 
Science and Medicine, 48 (1999): 977-988 
184 Ibid 
185 See J. Botkin, “Fetal privacy and confidentiality,” Hastings Center Report 25, no. 3 (1995): 32-39; and 
D. C. Wertz, and J. C. Fletcher. “A critique of some feminist challenges to prenatal diagnosis,” Journal of 
Women’s Health. 2, no. 2 (1993): 173-188 
  63
themselves as no different in this regard.  Some persons with disability may have a 
negative view of their life, just as a “normal” individual can.  One cannot predict that an 
individual will have such a view, or what particular life experience will be had in either 
instance, as a result we ought to “err” on the side of life.  It may be contended that some 
impairments are so inherently distressing, that we ought to err on the side of not inflicting 
a life of pain on the individual.  Such an argument may further assert that the point of life 
can be outweighed by the burden of life.  However, life has intrinsic value, and is of 
ultimate value to the person even if subjectively.  Although the presence or absence of a 
disability does not predict quality of life, nor inherently makes such persons worse off, 
this unexamined assumption stubbornly persists.  It is considered unreasonable to base 
preferences on race, gender, or orientation, but such reasoning is not applied to those with 
impairments. 
Intending to choose persons based on assumptions of quality of life or normality 
incorporates the eugenic ideals professed to be distilled from modern prenatal screening.  
In addition, clinicians, counselors, bioethicists, and others regularly dismiss data 
indicating that those with disabilities and their families do not necessarily view their lives 
negatively.186  Such experts may contend that such accounts reflect a “denial of reality” 
or “an exceptional ability to cope with problems”.187  Despite professional skepticism, 
parents arguably ought to know that studies confirm that “there is a level of agreement 
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approaching consensus that the overall adaptation profile for families who have children 
with disabilities basically resembles the overall profile for families in general”.188 
Although individuals with a close relationship with someone that has a disability 
find it “more difficult to evaluate the meaning or worth of that person’s existence solely 
in terms of their genetic disease,” genetic testing encourages the consideration of 
individuals in precisely narrow terms; that there is no need to discover anything beyond 
the identified impairment.189  Prenatal screening reinforces the notion that certain persons 
are too flawed or unacceptable, and a conscious decision therefore needs to be made 
regarding their life.  This practice indicates “an intolerance of diversity not merely in the 
society but in the family,” potentially harming parental attitudes toward children in 
general.190  The notion that “defectives should not be born” is a standard without 
boundaries.  It will be the “soft-hearted rather than the hard-hearted judges who will 
establish the doctrine of second-class human beings, out of compassion for the mutants 
who escaped the traps set out for them”.191  The routine acceptance of screening prevents 
thoughtful consideration of what is at stake in our aggressive testing practices. 
Prenatal genetic screening requires deciding what is “normal” and “abnormal,” 
which presumes that we know what these mean.  The concept of defining and enforcing a 
particular “normalcy” is at the core of what screening attempts to accomplish, and was 
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what eugenicists of the past fervently advocated.192  Screening is presented as the means 
of ensuring a normal child, yet it misleads parents in this perceived control.  Testing 
cannot guarantee a life without disability, numerous childhood disabilities occur by 
accident and illness, yet this practice encourages us to think of children as products that 
can be rubber stamped by a quality control method.  Society treats “a small set of 
identities it endorses as if they were intrinsically true,” creating enormous pressure to 
consider anything that differs to be “fundamental threats, deviations or failures in need of 
correction, reform, punishment, silencing or liquidation”.193  The physically and mentally 
able control the discourse, and identify which features are unacceptable, and this 
dogmatization feeds into the discrimination of others and shapes the further development 
and usage of genetic screening. 
Deviations from “normal species functioning” are considered diminishing to the 
range of opportunity open to the individual;194 as a result, disability may be believed to be 
incompatible with a satisfactory existence.  A particular level of health is considered 
intrinsically desirable, and a “prerequisite for an acceptable life”.195  The functional 
deficit of a disability is assumed to deprive the individual of the “right to an open 
future”.196  Although those that will have a disability may have fewer options for the 
“open future” that philosophers and parents envision, this does not preclude many people 
with disabilities to find their lives satisfying.197  Prenatal screening is not offered as a 
means to prevent a health inequality, but to prevent the birth of a person that has an 
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undesirable characteristic.  It places qualifications on who ought to receive the nurturance 
of a family and society, and does not consider the variety of ways that individuals may 
contribute to the community. 
 
 
Choice and Commodification 
 
 
Parents are unconstrained in choosing whether to reproduce, and many have 
asserted that they should also have the liberty to decide to avoid an undesirable product 
of reproduction.  Yet this kind of posture toward children and reproduction seems to treat 
human life as commodity.  It ought to be considered what it means to increasingly regard 
a child “not as a mysterious stranger given to be cherished as someone to take our place, 
but rather as a product of our will, to be perfected by our design and to satisfy our 
wants”.198 
The history of eugenics demonstrates the pitfalls in viewing individuals as chattel 
to be controlled.  Notions of what is to be socially valued are overwhelmingly subjective, 
and encourage the view that persons are not of value unless they meet a certain criterion 
or contribute in a specific way.  Individual choice does not eliminate the problem of 
eugenics, but is another means of pursuing such ideals.  As more characteristics are being 
characterized as genetic, and possibilities expand, the options to be chosen regarding 
one’s offspring will become a veritable “eugenic boutique”.   
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It may be argued that parents are the best to know what type of child they could handle 
raising, and they should not be burdened with what they do not want to take on.  
However, individual preference is difficult to argue without an uncontentious basis to 
appeal to when preventing a particular life for the sake of it seeming to be inferior.  The 
idea that children ought to be chosen by personal preference denies that the value to be 
“found in different kinds of human life may be incommensurable”.199  These factors 
make it difficult to justify eliminating a developing human being simply for features that 
parents disvalue.  Being able to choose always seems like a benefit to have, especially 
from the point of view of a consumer presented with a variety of products.  Yet this does 
not seem to be the interaction we ought to have with our children, who inevitably vary 
from what parents envision.  Prenatal screening can provide an illusion of choice, but 
children are still “hostages to fortune”.200  The social issues involved with our attitudes 
toward those that do not fit the norm and our response to them cannot be solved by 
making impairments and individual problem.201    
The modern focus on aesthetics and beauty has an inevitable impact on how those 
with disabilities are viewed and judged.  An array of interventions may be obtained to 
eliminate imperfections.  The availability of these products and services has become the 
acceptable response to flaws; something is expected to be obtained to eradicate it.202  The 
social concept of what is physically acceptable unsurprisingly affects “medical practice in 
general and policies on prenatal diagnosis in particular”.203  Prenatal screening requires 
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the judgment of whether a unique individual should be discarded because of a perceived 
amount of suffering believed to be attached with that life.204  However, each individual is 
slated to experience a combination of harms and goods throughout life, but consider it to 
be worthwhile nonetheless.  This perspective makes it difficult to regard “a search and 
destroy policy towards genetic abnormalities” to be a justifiable response.205   
When a great deal of time and energy is invested to ensure a particular 
reproductive outcome, it becomes more difficult to accept anything less than what was 
expected.  This mentality creates selective acceptance, a morally problematic stance 
toward children.206  The increased use of testing has furthered inflated the belief that 
screening is necessary to produce a healthy child, and that the medical management of 
pregnancy can assure a particular outcome.  With the extended offering and acceptance of 
testing, those that are disabled will increasingly be viewed as reproductive errors or 
oversights.  These attitudes and expectations modify the experience of pregnancy and 
parenthood, as they did a century ago.    
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Modern Eugenics 
 
 
Prenatal screening reveals our consummate trust in what medical science provides 
to ensure acceptable offspring, and neglect of conversations that question whether we 
ought to aggressively pursue such testing.  Genetic interventions have been ingrained in 
the public conscious as an unquestionable good, with only a few technical obstacles, and 
bioethicists have been recruited to quell the fears of those that are resistant.  Eugenics is a 
method of coping with human differences.  The goals of eugenics have not changed, but 
are now couched in sanitary terms of choice and quality of life arguments.  Even without 
formal government enforcement, coercive forces persist in directing individuals toward 
perceived ideals and norms.  That persons have little value unless they meet a certain 
criterion reflects a eugenic rational, insistent of a particular standard.   
Prenatal screening is eugenic as it “necessarily involves the systematic selection 
of fetuses”.  Although the term “eugenics” is “scrupulously avoided” in most scientific 
and medical discussion regarding prenatal diagnosis, except when it is disclaimed as a 
motive, this testing “presupposes that certain fetal conditions are intrinsically not 
bearable”.207  Prenatal testing is presented as a means of ensuring a healthy child, as a 
reasonable and routine aspect of prenatal care, and regards those that do not take 
advantage of it as denying themselves of important information.  The perceived good in 
obtaining all available information, and taking control, is emphasized in this manner.  
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Prenatal testing does not guarantee perfect health, yet it is extended in a way that leads 
recipients to believe that screening will provide such validation.  Eugenics deems certain 
individuals as unfit to warrant their inclusion in the human community, or to provide 
them with social goods.  It supports the view that a particular standard is necessary for 
life to have value, and science will assist in achieving that goal.  However, advances in 
scientific knowledge are not likely to help us resolve moral issues, or with determining 
what the goals of medicine should be.   
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